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ABSTRACT: This paper examines a theoretical perspective on the ways in which 
children progress in learning mathematics. It suggests that there is a difficulty in 
associating teaching discourses with the mathematics they locate. This can result in an 
incommensurability between alternative perspectives being offered. The paper resists 
attempts to privilege any particular account but rather demands an analysis of these 
discourses and their presuppositions. In developing these themes the paper invokes 
Ricoeur’s analysis of time and narrative as an analytical approach to treating notions such 
as transition, development and progression in mathematical learning. His notion of 
semantic innovation is introduced. This embraces both the introduction of a new 
metaphor into a sentence or the creation of a new narrative which reorganises events into 
a new “plot”. The notion is utilised in arguing that the shift in the student’s mathematical 
development from arithmetic to first order linear equations with unknowns reconfigures 
the contextual parameters governing the understanding of these mathematical forms. It is 
also utilised in showing how alternative approaches to accounting for such transitions suit 
different and perhaps conflicting outcomes. For example, demonstrating awareness of 
generality or performing well in a diagnostic test featuring the solution of linear 
equations.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is about development in student mathematical performance but not so much 
how to achieve it. Rather the paper is about how it is seen and how it functions as a 
notion in guiding our actions as researchers and teachers focusing on students progressing 
through successive stages in a developmentally formulated curriculum. We shall refer to 
some work describing the transition children make from work in arithmetic towards 
simple algebra. This will provide examples of how student mathematical development is 
treated in the mathematics education research literature. Meanwhile, in literary theory 
Ricoeur (e.g. 1984) has carried out detailed work on conceptions of time and how these 
depend on the narratives we create. He argues that we cannot rely on simplistic notions of 
time understood as the passing of phenomenologically defined events. Rather 
descriptions of time can always be revisited and revised. We suggest that this opens up an 
analytical frame within which alternative accounts of transition or development, as 
understood within educational discourses, can reside. This work falls against a backdrop 
of an increasingly post-modern attitude prevalent in contemporary theoretical writings, 
where notions of progression or advancement are treated with a certain amount of 
caution. Such approaches do not see human actions specified in terms of intention 
motivated towards some pre-understood ideal. Instead these approaches describe a 
perpetual state of becoming, governed through the social discourses enacted through the 
individual. This we suggest prevents easy association between educational strategies and 
the mathematics they seek to locate since neither can be pinned down in an essentialist 
manner.
We begin with a brief look at how the essential ambiguity of mathematical phenomena 
resists clear depiction of transition in mathematical learning in linguistic form. We then 
review some examples of research in mathematics education that discuss the transition 
from arithmetic to algebra. We consider how alternative accounts of this transition might 
be generated and point to the suppositions and assumptions inherent in these. We follow 
this with an introduction to Ricoeur’s work on metaphor, time and narrative. It is then 
shown how this might lead us to an alternative approach to describing mathematical 
understanding. This is illustrated by developing the analysis offered within the 
mathematical studies. Here we discuss how the introduction of unknowns into 
arithmetical equations can be seen as metaphorical disturbances which have the effect of 
adjusting the sense of all of the terms within any given equation. Similarly, we discuss 
how the introduction of certain teaching models can be seen as impacting on the narrative 
structure within which “transitions” in mathematical learning are effected. In this way we 
demonstrate how the intermediate role of language intervenes as a powerful arbiter of the 
reality to which we attend. Although as authors we are aware that this applies to us and 
the language we use as well.
MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS
How do we account for transition in mathematical learning when such transition resists 
clear depiction in tangible evidence? Mathematics education research is generally 
predicated on some notion of improvement being sought. Often this is seen in terms of 
hastening this transition, whether this be focused on children progressing through a 
curriculum, or teachers or researchers developing improved strategies for facilitating this. 
Part of our task here is to problematise conceptions of moving from one domain to 
another. We suggest that any depiction of source and target domains, or of the transition 
between them, resist phenomenological accountability. That is, targets expressed in terms 
of desired trajectories seem problematic insofar as we attempt to claim movement from 
state A to state B. As many recent research reports in mathematics education research 
remind us, mathematics and the students studying it are socially construed entities 
susceptible to temporal and compositional shift (e.g. Brown, 1997). We can always 
revisit and reread an interpretation of how a child proceeded through some mathematical 
exercises. We thus need to be cautious in defining states of mind, or even mathematical 
competencies, that position students in one domain or another. Such critical perspectives 
have surely lost some of their appeal in any case after the work of contemporary writers 
(e.g. Walkerdine, 1988) who have resisted psychologically oriented accounts centring 
analysis around singular developing minds, such as that provided by Piaget’s stage 
analysis. For this reason there is also a need to be cautious in introducing models and to 
be more aware of their presuppositions and limitations. We cannot easily define such an 
organisation of events which effects a transition to have happened. For within any such 
event there are multiple plots highlighting or implicating alternative phenomenological 
features. We shall set the scene with a few examples of how such issues concern us in our 
understanding of children’s early work in algebra.
Sfard and Linchevski (1994 a, p. 191) assert that algebraic symbols do not speak for 
themselves. Rather, any algebraic expression has a range of possible senses and can be 
read in a number of ways. For example, the expression  3(x+5)+1 can be read as a 
computational process, a certain number, a function, a family of functions or merely as a 
string of symbols. Indeed, they claim, we can identify “an inherent process-object duality 
in the majority of mathematical concepts” (ibid). Meanwhile Gray and Tall (1994) 
introduce the term “procept” to identify this duality. They suggest that the “ambiguity of 
notation allows the successful thinker the flexibility in thought to move between the 
process to carry out a mathematical task and the concept to be mentally manipulated as 
part of a wider schema”. This schema however can be conceptualised in a variety of 
different ways. For example, many studies privilege accounts which assume that 
arithmetic precedes algebra (e.g. Filloy and Rojano, 1989; Herscovics and Linchevski, 
1994, both to be discussed shortly). This is the direct opposite to that described in the 
work of Gattegno (e.g. 1988, pp. 74). He sees algebra preceding arithmetic where algebra 
is a “way of speaking of the mental dynamics necessary to transform some mental given 
into another mental form”, within which arithmetic resides. He claims however that 
school education favours verbal description. This he sees as resulting in an overemphasis 
on algebraic ways of thinking, at the cost of certain areas of mathematics, e.g. geometric 
intuition, that do not fit so easily into this sort of categorisation. Thus the school 
curriculum concentrates on topics that are more easily explained in this way (see Brown, 
1996 a, p. 61). Similarly, we take from Mason’s (1996) work that the reductionism 
implicit in emphasising issues of transition through progressively more difficult forms of 
algebraic equation, draws attention away from the underlying principle of algebra being 
about the noting of generality. He suggests that many programs of instruction stress the 
particularity of concrete objects which has the effect of drawing attention away from the 
general, thus favouring behaviour over awareness (op cit, p. 70). It seems that the 
mathematician’s idealism is both located but also evaded within the research models we 
create in our analysis. This in itself will come as no great surprise; models are inevitably 
simplifications introduced to help us see structure (Linchevski and Williams, 1996, p. 
266). It does however bring into question the virtue of any quest to privilege any 
particular model or any final declaration as to the mathematical content this locates. 
Also, how we see the salient features of mathematical learning is a function of where we 
are positioned in any educative process. For tutors concerned with the initial or in-service 
training of teachers, clearly it is important to equip one’s students with the sorts of 
mathematical insight described above. However, an alternative style of objective might 
be assumed by a policy maker seeking to promote effective performance in tests designed 
to facilitate international comparisons in mathematical achievement. Here understanding 
is often reduced to being assessed against more quantifiable performance criteria.  
It seems inescapable that pedagogical discourses are a function of the enterprise they 
support. And that these discourses govern the choice of teaching devices, which in turn 
condition the mathematics learnt through them. For example, in his analysis of a teaching 
scheme, Dowling (1996) found mathematics which was designed for less able students to 
be of a very different nature to that given to their more able peers. For any given topic the 
emphasis in the instruction varied between the texts designed for the two sorts of 
students. It seemed to result in exclusion for the less able from the real business of 
mathematics as understood in more abstract terms. Instead they were caught in the 
discourse of “less able” mathematics. The analysis identified at least two levels of 
mathematics, each characterised by a discourse with associated styles of illustration, 
questioning, perspectives assumed, etc. But clearly there are many such discourses 
operating in mathematics education. And as with the distinctions between mathematics 
designed in the schemes for less or more able students, differences between these 
discourses are swept over. In many situations this is a consequence of outcomes being 
seen primarily on a register of mathematical content, independent of the processes that 
lead to these. Nevertheless each of these discourses misses the mathematics it seeks to 
locate. Each is characterised by some sort of illustrative approach which simultaneously 
serves as a teaching device, but this arguably draws us away from the mathematics. (The 
educational strategy of getting analogies to fit the ideas being taught is also well trodden 
in science education. See for example Heywood and Parker, 1997). This, of course, is 
also true of the mathematics designed for the more able students following the scheme 
where situations are couched in more overtly mathematical form.  But each of these 
discourses is predicated on some sort of mathematical objective. This might be tied down 
to performance in a specific discursive frame, such as the solving of a linear equation, or 
more transcendental mathematical claims such as abstraction, the noting of generality or 
intuition. Ricoeur’s analysis will assist us in distinguishing between these alternative 
narrative layers. It will also help us in showing how mathematical development in 
children might be seen as being conditioned by and dependent on narratives embedded in 
the teaching and learning process. But for now we consider how such narratives are 
generated.
THE TRANSITION FROM ARITHMETICAL TO ALGEBRAIC THINKING: TWO 
ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS
We shall focus on certain aspects of two studies taken from the field of research in 
mathematics education. These will provide examples of papers which address the 
student’s transition from arithmetic to algebra, and in particular, the introduction of 
unknowns into arithmetic equations. Filloy and Rojano’s (1989) work sees this transition 
as mathematically defined. Meanwhile, Herscovics and Linchevski (1994) work sees it as 
cognitive. These will show different ways in which this transition is described within the 
research literature. We will also be referring to another paper by Sfard and Linchevski 
(1994 b) which suggests an interesting disruption to any dichotomising of these two 
perspectives. These examples will then be utilised in support of our introduction of 
Ricoeur’s theoretical perspective.
Didactic cut
How might we characterise the shift from arithmetic to algebra? Filloy and Rojano 
(1989) introduce the notion of “didactic cut” between arithmetic and algebra. They see 
this as arising when the child’s arithmetical resources break down in tackling linear 
equations. They suggest that a sharp delineation between arithmetic and algebra can be 
identified when in a first degree equation the student encounters for the first time the 
unknown on both sides, e.g. Ax+B=Cx+D. When the unknown only appears on one side 
they suggest the solution can be found intuitively through purely arithmetical means and 
hence with existing skills, such as counting procedures or inverse operation. Thereafter 
they claim additional resources are needed and to overcome this barrier. The students 
then require assistance from the teacher who needs to provide some sort of device which 
enables the student to negotiate access to the new domain. They go yet further by 
suggesting that this introduction of teaching strategies results in an inevitable diversion in 
reaching mathematical objectives. This is because the teaching devices create obstacles 
through their introduction of intermediate codes, ie between functioning at the concrete 
level and the fully syntactic algebraic level. They talk in terms of taking students in the 
“the direction of what algebra is intended to achieve”. However, this “direction” cannot 
be specified directly but needs to be alluded to through teaching devices. Whilst these 
devices assist in broaching new territory, they inevitably draw attention away a little from 
the conceptual understanding being sought. These  
“hinder the abstraction of the operations performed at the concrete level and are due to a 
lack, in the transition period, of adequate means of representing to which the various 
operations lead. The obstacles arise from a sort of “essential insufficiency’ in the sense 
that modelling ... tends to hide what it is meant to teach (Filloy and Rojano, 1989, p. 25).
Such modelling, they suggest, is characterised by two components, namely transition and 
separation. They argue:
When either of these two components is strengthened at the expense of the other, the new 
objects and operations become harder to see (ibid).
For example, the noting of generality might become obscured if the student becomes 
locked within the domain of a particular model or teaching device, having separated 
herself from the task of seeking the abstraction implied by the more concrete domain. 
Cognitive gap
Herscovics and Linchevski (1994, pp. 59-61, see also Linchevski and Herscovics, 1996) 
also seek  a “clear-cut demarcation between arithmetic and algebra”. However, they 
question Filloy and Rojano’s notion of didactical cut on the grounds, they claim, that it 
focuses on mathematical form rather than process. They introduce the notion of a 
“cognitive gap” which “is characterized by the students inability to operate with or on  
the unknown” (p. 75, their emphasis). This they see as moving the boundary being 
considered from one between two mathematically defined domains to one separating 
developmental stages in the learner’s conceptions. Their findings with seventh grade 
students suggested that in equations where the variable appeared just once (e.g. ax+b=c 
or 37-n=19), nearly all students solved the equations arithmetically by inverse operations. 
However, a fundamental shift was noted when the variable appeared twice, either on just 
one side (e.g ax+bx=c) or on both sides (e.g. ax+b=cx+d). They found
the majority of students were able to solve them only by reverting to a process of 
systematic approximations based on numerical substitution. Although students managed 
to spontaneously group terms that were purely numeric, at no time did we witness any 
systematic attempt to group the terms in the unknown. We came to the conclusion that 
the students could not operate spontaneously with or on the unknown. The literal symbol 
was being viewed as a static position, and an operational aspect entered only when the 
letter was replaced by a number. This inability to spontaneously operate on or with the 
unknown constitutes a cognitive obstacle that could be considered a gap between 
arithmetic and algebra. (Linchevski and Herscovics, 1996, p. 41)
Having identified this gap the authors then carried out empirical research to examine 
ways in which it might be crossed. Their findings include some suggestions of specific 
teaching techniques designed to overcome this particular gap, such as exercises in 
grouping like terms, developments of the balance model and decomposing into a 
difference to facilitate cancelling subtracted terms (Linchevski and Herscovics, 1996). 
They do however stress that “it is only when they (the students) achieve a more general 
perspective on equations, solutions and solution procedures that they can appreciate the 
value of a more general solution process” (op. cit., p. 63)
STORYING TRANSITION
It seems to us that the difference between these two examples from the research literature 
highlights the potential for creating alternative accounts (or stories) of how this boundary 
is broached. And the need for care in privileging particular accounts. We continue with 
some discussion of the student’s perspective on this transition. This is followed by a 
consideration of some of the research issues involved in depicting the transition.
Student preferences
Quite apart from accounts offered by researchers we can observe storying carried out by 
the students themselves within their own learning. That is the way in which they describe 
their own transition, and the ways in which they situate any developing understanding of 
particular mathematical ideas within their broader conceptions of what constitutes 
mathematics. (See for example, Ruthven and Coe, 1994, Rodd, 1993.) Any addition to 
the student’s mathematical repertoire is understood within a broader narrative frame 
within which narrower conceptions of mathematics reside. That is, students utilise a 
broad range of metaphorical apparatus in supporting their own mathematical thinking. 
Yet these are situated within their broader narrative accounts of why things are as they 
are and how they connect with other bits of mathematics and life outside. The student’s 
experience we conjecture is not of a straightforward switch from arithmetic to algebra. 
Their storying backdrop, the contextualisation that receives and conditions any 
unfamiliar statement, needs to be extended at the same time. Although as Sfard and 
Linchevski (1994 b) indicate children do this in different ways and have different needs 
as regards providing supporting rationale for their implementation of procedures. They 
show us that we cannot assume consistency between children as to their apparent 
readiness to occupy a new domain and that this readiness is not straightforwardly 
associated with broader mathematical ability. They discuss a child whose preference for 
considered interpretive assessment of meaning slows him down against a peer more 
amenable to unreflective implementation of techniques. It is this example which gives 
rise to their distinction between “interpreter” and “doer”. They characterise the students’ 
respective motives as follows:
“the meaningfulness ... of the learning is, to a great extent, a function of student’s 
expectations and aims: true interpreters will struggle for meaning whether we help them 
or not, whereas the doers will always rush to do things rather than think about them. The 
problem with the doers stems not so much from the fact that they are not able to find 
meaning as from their lack of urge to look for it. In a sense they do not even bother about 
what it means to understand mathematics. (Sfard and Linchevski, 1994 b, p. 264)
This muddies the water in any attempt to draw clear distinctions between mathematical 
and cognitive domains. On the one hand we have unreflective performance of 
mathematical procedures, on the other a more sustained attempt to understand which 
seems to work against performance at least in the short term. This seems to disrupt any 
straightforward attempt to correlate cognitive ability with mathematical performance. The 
preferences of interpreter and doer seem to conflict. Their mathematical progression is in 
different ways dependent on, among other things, chosen teaching strategies, the 
assessment instruments applied etc. These in varying degrees impact on the student 
through the way in which they perceive their work being evaluated. Also learning 
theories used in explaining this progression might be seen as partisan, prejudicing against 
particular learners or against certain capacities or potentialities present within all learners. 
Research concerns in depicting transition
Insofar as mathematical learning supports both intrinsically mathematical concerns as 
well as more utilitarian enterprises, facility with both abstractions and concretisations 
seems crucial. Mathematical agendas perhaps privilege the former, while more utilitarian 
agendas (including those frequently assumed within school mathematics) privilege the 
latter. It was these concerns that led us to question the ways in which differences of 
results between the two studies cited have been put down to sampling differences, 
different experimental conditions etc. (Herscovics and Linchevski, 1994, p. 75). Rather 
than to incommensurability of the research models being applied. The very quest for 
some “clear-cut demarcation” between arithmetic and algebra seems fraught with 
difficulty from the outset. We cannot breach the inevitable divide that separates 
mathematical and cognitive domains within such models. Between the two models there 
appears to be a dichotomous choice between seeing the transition as separating, in the 
former, two distinctive mathematical forms and, in the latter, two developmental 
cognitive stages. It is this disjunction that a more hermeneutic analysis would seek to 
dissolve (e.g. Brown, 1997). Here we pursue this style of analysis by focusing on how 
these various factors might be seen as being embedded within the narrative frame that 
guides the way we talk about mathematical transition and thus how this transition is 
marked. This analysis will assume a softer relation between the contextual parameters of 
mathematical activity and features being identified within these to highlight how the 
narrative layer can be seen as being instrumental in creating both.
SEMANTIC INNOVATION
Over the last twenty or so years Paul Ricoeur (e.g. 1978, 1981, 1984, 1985, 1988) has 
carried out extensive work on how both metaphor and narrative can be seen as dual 
components within the overarching frame of what he calls semantic innovation (1978, p. 
55; 1984, pp. ix-xi). This analysis initially focused on the introduction of a new metaphor 
into a sentence. He later extended this to include the emplotment (muthos -  organisation 
of events) provided within some new narrative account. That is, the inclusion of a new 
narrative within our account of the world we experience results in a reconfiguration of the 
way in which the world is experienced and acted within. Ricoeur argues that such 
semantic innovation can be understood as an extension of familiar understandings held by 
an individual of the actions s/he takes towards incorporating figures of speech that allow 
the capturing of mental experience not readily accommodated within previous versions of 
his or her linguistic usage. He further argues that the passage of time does not lend itself 
to being described as a sequence of events, features or stages. Instead time needs to be 
understood as being mediated by narrative accounts of such transitions. These rely on 
interpretations which at a very basic level cannot be seen as comprising 
phenomenological features. 
Metaphor
Ricoeur considers how a metaphor functions within a sentence, where metaphor is 
depicted as follows:
The rhetoric of metaphor takes the word as its unit of reference. Metaphor, therefore, is 
classed among the single word figures of speech and is defined as a trope of resemblance. 
As figure, metaphor constitutes a displacement and an extension of the meaning of 
words; its explanation is grounded in a theory of substitution. (Ricoeur, 1978, p. 3)
He suggests that the use of a metaphor activates strains and stresses throughout the whole 
sentence in which the other words function in emphasising the “impertinence” of the new 
metaphor (1984, p. ix). These strains and stresses project us out of the realm of familiar 
literal meanings towards creating a meaning effect unattainable within the parameters of 
the previous realm. This also resonates with the seminal work of Jakobson where:
Metaphor (i.e live metaphor as opposed to clichés that have lost their figurative force) is 
necessarily perceived as incongruous or surprising, at first apparently not compatible 
semantically with its context.  Groden and Kreiswirth (1994, p. 419).
In Jakobson’s formulation metaphor, which is seen as a shift in literal sense, is contrasted 
both with metonymy and synedoche . Metonymy is where something related stands in for 
the thing being referred to (e.g. “he’s taken to the bottle” rather than “he’s taken to the 
drink”). Synedoche is where a part of the thing stands in for the whole (“You mustn’t 
show your face around here again”). These are both seen as shifts in reference (Groden 
and Kreiswirth, ibid.). See also Ricoeur’s discussion of these distinctions (1978, pp. 55-
59). The distinctions between these various terms are discussed in relation to 
mathematics education by Tahta (1991) and Presmeg (1997). The former offers an 
important comment by Wilden (1980, p. 58):
Metaphor and metonymy are not entities, they are categories of distinction, not bags to 
put things in ... this polar distinction itself has a signification only in a context, and since 
everything has everything else as its context, it is up to the commentator to define the 
context he is talking about.
We shall discuss this in relation to an example taken from the mathematical studies cited. 
The studies distinguish between forms such as 7+?=23 and 7+x=23. Both studies see the 
former as being strictly within the realm of arithmetic. Meanwhile, the latter, in 
appearance at least, ventures into simple algebra or “pre-algebra” (Filloy and Rojano, p. 
20, Herscovics and Linchevski, pp. 60-63). Similarly, in their study Sfard and Linchevski 
(1994 b, p. 259) consider some children who have met the former but not the latter. 
Both ? and x appear as surprising to a student familiar with equations such as 3 + 4 = 7, 
but surprising in different ways. Taking ? and x as words being introduced into sentences, 
they have different metaphorical effects. Previously these symbols have been met in 
different circumstances, both in the mathematics classroom and elsewhere, and will hold 
particular senses for the student. Applying Ricoeur’s analysis, our interpretation of the 
distinction between ? and x would, very crudely, be as follows. The ? is understood as 
being a simple “missing” number. Meanwhile, the introduction of the x hints at a new 
realm within which the significance of x might be seen as rather more than this simple 
substitution of a fixed numerical value. The inclusion of ? maintains affinity to the class 
of arithmetical equations, whilst the inclusion of x shifts the context being attended to by 
asserting affinity to the class of pre-algebra equations as yet unknown by the student. The 
x does not just add a term, it charges all of the terms within the complete mathematical 
sentence with a new meaning. In one sense the x can be seen as a simple metaphorical 
substitution of a single digit number, giving a new flavour to the equation. But in another 
sense its introduction also synedochially signifies a new realm beyond such simple 
manipulation. The introduction of the variable into the equation thus results in a complete 
recontextualisation of the equation resulting in a reevaluation of each component term. 
So at once the x signifies a single digit, but to someone unfamiliar with such usage it also 
signifies the possibility of a whole new mysterious realm of mathematical activity, with 
new syntax and new rules of composition. The mysterious nature of this may not only 
block the student’s transition into facility with these new forms but may also through 
obscuring familiar forms incapacitate students from performing familiar skills. And 
indeed the child soon discovers that the x cannot be read only as a simple fixed number. 
Narrative
Ricoeur (1988, p. 241) has argued at length that “temporality cannot be spoken of in the 
direct discourse of phenomenology, but rather requires the mediation of the indirect 
discourse of narration”. Features of time, progress, development and shift are not 
constituted through agreeable criteria. They all depend on interpretations reflecting 
attitudes produced within history, ideology and auto-biography. Any such transition 
embraces the components of a new domain. This entails meeting new syntactic forms 
which characterise the new emplotment (how events are organised in to accounts of what 
happened) and comprise new styles of compositions, new styles of questioning, a new 
way of acting, a new way of feeling and new ways of making sense that begin to become 
familiar through practice. Any movement to a new way of living can only be spoken “by 
means of the complex interplay between the metaphorical utterance and the rule-
governed transgressions of the usual meanings of our words” (Ricoeur, 1984, p. xi). 
Ricoeur suggests that this moves beyond mere seeing as, but rather becomes “being as on 
the deepest ontological level” (ibid, our emphasis). This shift also underlies Ricoeur’s 
(1981, pp. 182-196) use of the term “appropriation”   in his analysis of how we read 
text. In this the act of reading extends to incorporating the change in the way of living 
consequential to absorption of the work. Within our analysis such appropriation is not 
limited to interpretation at the level of immediate comprehension. It also needs to include 
reflected upon application within performance where the student’s storying backdrop is 
given time to settle. This is discussed more fully in relation to teachers analysing their 
own reflective writing produced over a period of time within practitioner research studies 
by Brown (1996 b, 1997, pp. 172-211). Here the meaning of any given piece of teacher 
writing can be revisited according to how it is composed alongside other pieces written at 
other points in time in creating any fuller account. For example, a piece of writing 
depicting an interaction between teacher and pupil might have been created originally as 
part of an attempt to better understand a teaching technique. It may then later be 
interpreted as evidence of where that teacher was at the time in terms of conceptualising 
his or her practice as part of a broader account of how that teacher’s practice has 
developed. We shall consider shortly how this style of analysis might apply in 
discussions of children’s mathematical work and the sorts of narrative that might 
accompany this.
Ricoeur’s analysis commences in a curious way. He begins with an account of 
Augustine’s twelfth century work Confessions which discusses the paradoxes of time, an 
account built up without any reference to narrative issues. He then follows this with a 
discussion of Aristotle’s Poetics, which addresses the notion of Plot, written some 1500 
years earlier, an account formulated with no reference to time. He then combines them in 
a thesis within which time and narrative are mutually constitutive whereby “time 
becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through narrative mode, and narrative 
attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence” (1984, p. 52). 
Following Aristotle he suggests Plot combines muthos  (emplotment - the organisation of 
events) and the mimesis (the imitation of an action) (Ricoeur, 1984, pp. 31-51). But in his 
analysis Ricoeur introduces three senses to the term mimesis. Firstly,  “a reference back 
to the familiar pre-understanding we have of the order of action (mimesis 1). Secondly, 
an entry into the realm of poetic composition (mimesis 2). And thirdly, a new 
configuration by means of this poetic refiguring of the pre-understood order of action 
(mimesis 3)” (op cit., p.  xi). 
How might such emplotments feature in analyses of children’s mathematics? We shall 
revisit the paper by Filloy and Rojano to see how Ricoeur’s analysis might assist us in 
developing their account of mathematical transition in the context of early algebra. Filloy 
and Rojano (1989, p. 21) consider the example of Ax + B = Cx within a “geometric 
model” where a rectangle of dimensions  A and x plus a rectangle of area B is equivalent 
to a rectangle of dimensions C and x. This organisation of events might be seen as an 
example of emplotment in Ricoeur’s sense: 
*
They also offer an alternative emplotment, namely, a “balance model” where A objects 
with equal unknown weight x together with B objects of equal known weight are 
equivalent to C objects with the same unknown weight x (ibid). We agree with Filloy and 
Rojano that such emplotments are necessary to facilitate transition. The contrasting 
senses of mimesis mentioned seem pertinent in developing their analysis of children 
moving from arithmetic to algebraic functioning by way of such models. Here we shall 
focus in particular on the shift from “undoing” as learnt in the former to carrying out “the 
same operation on both sides of an equation” in the latter (cf. Sfard and Linchevski, 1994 
b). We now refer briefly to Filloy and Rojano’s discussion of children using the 
geometric model.
Filloy and Rojano (ibid) offer the example of a girl who showed considerable proficiency 
in solving arithmetical equations, including those with negative solutions. Her attention is 
then turned to the task of dealing with equations where a variable appeared on both sides. 
In the first instance the student’s grappling with algebra can be seen as an attempt to 
apply previously held arithmetic understanding into new types of problem (mimesis 1). 
The girl is then introduced to the geometric model to assist her with equations where the 
variable appears on both sides. There is now an attempt to grapple with new meanings in 
an as yet unfamiliar domain. In tackling the equation 8x + 30 = 5x + 9 she is quite able to 
use the model in simplifying the equation to 3x + 30 = 9 but then falters in reaching the 
final solution despite her previous proficiency in handling equations of this form. It has to 
be suggested to her that she abandon the geometric model and return to her old methods 
before she can complete the task. This might be seen as exploratory work with new forms 
(mimesis 2). Thirdly, the model that had assisted this transition becomes increasingly 
marginalised and we hope eventually the new realm is operated in more confidently as 
the new home base (mimesis 3). Filloy and Rojano (op cit, p. 23) provide an example of a 
child breaking away from the geometric model, as she transfers the “operativity on the 
coefficients to the terms containing the unknown”. In being confronted with 16x - 15x 
she can quickly conclude that “There should be one times x”. They indicate however 
(ibid) that in their study the children varied in their level of persistence with any 
particular model, even when they displayed similar levels of pre-algebra proficiency. 
Some children persisted with the geometric model even when this required very 
complicated modelling procedures. Meanwhile, others had already moved to proficiency 
without needing the model. The course through these three phases is individualised and 
not analogous to cognitive stages in that the choice of approach made is not directly 
related to cognitive ability. Rather, it is more down to individual preference of working 
method, contextual awareness, perceived objective and the narratives these produce. 
Ricoeur’s assertion that time is dependent on and conditioned by narratives offered 
within it seems closely analogous to the suggestion that mathematical development in 
students is dependent on and conditioned by the narratives embedded in the teaching and 
learning process. Some of these narratives are derived from students’, teachers’ and 
researchers’ respective storying backdrops, built through their familiarity with particular 
situations and their approach to orienting themselves within them. Others are introduced 
explicitly for a particular purpose, such as teaching devices designed to enable students to 
negotiate certain transitions. Such devices necessarily introduce a metaphorical 
impertinence whereby familiar apparatuses are utilised in unfamiliar ways to introduce a 
new noticing not available within familiar styles of expression. Here the distancing of the 
story from the mathematics is an inevitable aspect of the metaphorical adjustment to 
existing mathematical sense, necessary to enable new mathematical thinking. However, 
in taking such a move into this modified context familiar styles of expression also begin 
to mean something else, dislodging to some degree, probably temporarily as work cited 
suggests, meanings that were previously held securely. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Our attempt here has been to a) draw attention to suppositions and assumptions inherent 
in the ways we describe mathematical learning (i.e. that these accounts are developed 
within particular discourses), and b) offer an approach to depicting mathematical 
understanding that explicitly incorporates a more sophisticated notion of time drawing on 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. We have suggested that teaching devices (e.g. geometric or 
balance models as aids in understanding linear equations), which derive from alternative 
accounts of teaching and learning, can be understood as contributing to the necessary and 
inevitable temporal dimension of the constitution of the ideas we seek to address in our 
teaching. That is, they can be seen as emplotments that highlight or analogise particular 
features and then organise and sequence them. However, it may be that these strategies 
temporarily draw the students a little away from the mathematical objectives being 
ultimately sought. So for a child seeking to negotiate a perceived boundary one might 
understand the need for a plot that sees them across, connecting old emplotments, which 
have lost some of their old meanings, with new emplotments residing in the extended 
domain. It is this sort of process through which the metaphorical sense of any 
mathematical form is challenged to open up new ways of seeing. Mathematics is 
mediated and articulated through such teaching devices. These devices however should 
not be seen merely as a means to an end, since such embedding is crucial to the 
constitution of the ideas being studied within “school mathematics”. Such constructions 
of mathematics however also result in associated constructions of the students working 
through mathematics construed in this way. That is, the student is seen as “high” or “low” 
ability, at a particular “developmental stage”, “ready” for a particular style of teaching, 
“mathematically intuitive”, an “interpreter” or a “doer”, etc. These terms predicate 
particular learning theories or evaluation strategies, and the particular characteristics they 
value. Nevertheless, proficiency with concretisations is integral to the broader proficiency 
of moving between concrete and abstract domains, a proficiency which lies at the heart of 
mathematical endeavours (at least in schools). Indeed, one might suggest that for many 
students and many teachers proficiency in specific concretisations forms the backbone 
and principal motivation of activity pursued within the classroom.
POSTSCRIPT: THE FUNCTION OF RESEARCH
 “for nothing is more necessary today than to renounce the arrogance of critique and carry 
on with patience the endless work of distancing and renewing our historical substance.” 
(Ricoeur, 1981, p. 246)
What is the main function of learning theories and how are they associated with revisions 
of practice?  In the United Kingdom, as in many other countries, “mathematical 
performance” in school, conceived as a social construct, is closely related to how it is 
described in government documentation, with all the associated paraphernalia of 
curriculum descriptions, testing instruments, “competencies” for teachers, etc. Our 
intention in this paper is not to suggest ways of improving the teaching of algebra. We 
have preferred to use a very specific aspect of algebra as an example of how 
mathematical transition can be conceptualised, given that social context is so integral to 
mathematical formation in the school setting. Thus the consequence of reading this paper 
may not be so much a task for the teacher of adjusting teaching techniques but rather to 
become more sensitive to the enterprises particular approaches favour. We thus diverge 
from cognitive stage theories whose analysis is centred around students progressing 
through successively more difficult mathematical concepts. Our analysis has sought to 
emphasise the inter-relation, within a socially constructed domain, of mathematical 
competencies, mathematical understandings, teaching methods, learning theories, 
curriculum frameworks, research perspectives, etc. 
We also need to take care in understanding the ways in which we perceive shifts in the 
conceptions of the mathematics education research community. We conjecture that it is 
unhelpful to understand research as enabling us to move towards an ideal whereby we 
make iterative steps towards a better way of doing things. Change itself is the 
characteristic we seek. We need to understand research as a mechanism present within 
this process of change through which we distance and historicise ourselves. Ricoeur’s 
analysis suggests that narratives might be seen as always imperfect accounts of time but 
of a time that depends on these very narratives. Thus, Ricoeur still seeks to give a higher 
status to narratives in the construction of time. He also demonstrates the rather fine 
dividing line between historical and fictional constructions (Ricoeur, 1985). Teaching 
strategies are often seen by researchers as subordinate to the mathematical conceptions 
they seek to engender. Here we have asserted here that the  teaching devices of school 
mathematics need to be understood more as constructed and implicit components of the 
mathematical ideas we wish our students to encounter. Similarly, research discourses 
inevitably create the analytical frames we use which in turn create the objects we 
research; objects that grow whether we acknowledge this growth or not.   
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